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This article addresses the problems that courts face when dealing with
copyright infringement of musical compositions. Infringement of music presents
special problems for judges and juries because music is an intuitive art that is
nonverbal and nonvisual. Consequently, traditional methods of establishing
infringement are often unreliable when applied to music.
This paper will concentrate on the question of whether a composition that is
similar to, but not the same as, another work infringes on the other work. I This
inquiry is both qualitative and quantitative. First, one must establish that the first
work employs material from the second work. Determining whether copying has
occurred is often difficult, and the majority of this paper will deal with this
problem. Second, once copying has been established, one must determine whether
the quantity copied is sufficient to constitute illegal appropriation.
Part I of this paper examines and criticizes the methods courts have
employed to determine copyright infringement of musical compositions. Part II
shows how some scholars have dealt with this question. Part III presents this
author's solutions to determining infringement of musical works.
This paper will concentrate on infringement of popular music. Such suits
have been common and have involved such well-known musicians as George
Harrison, Yoko Ono, the Bee Gees, Mick Jagger, and Cole Porter. One
commentator has written that:
* Associate, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, Ky.; J. D., Louisville, Ky.; Ph.D., Musicology, City
University of New York; M.A., University of North Carolina.
I This paper will not discuss the most common type of copyright infringement of musical works-- the
situation where an infringer performs a copyrighted work without the permission of the copyright holder or
its agent, such as ASCAP or BMI. With this type of infringement, there is no question of authorship; the
usual issue is whether the infringer performed the piece.
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"popular music has built-in factors that make it an especially
tempting, increasingly complex battleground for copyright issues.
The main one is pop's colloquial, derivative, aural tradition.. . if a
song doesn't have some familiar element in its opening seconds,
radio programmers and most record-company executives are likely
to pass it by. The way it creates familiarity, however, is the stuff of
which lawsuits are made." 2
The typical situation occurs when the composer of an unknown work files
suit claiming that a popular, financially successful piece has been copied from his
work. The plaintiff will claim that it should be clear to all the world that the
defendant has stolen his masterpiece, while the defendant will allege that he has
never heard plaintiffs composition and has independently composed his piece.
Both sides will call musical experts that will either categorically demonstrate that
the defendant is a thief or is as innocent as a lamb. The court is then faced with the
herculean task of deciding which party is correct.
PART ONE
Anstein v. Porter
Arnstein v. Porter is the seminal case on copyright infringement. 3 Plaintiff, a
minor composer of sacred and popular music and a frequent plaintiff in
infringement actions, alleged that Cole Porter stole several of his pieces. The
alleged infringing works included some of Porter's best-known compositions,
such as "Begin the Beguine" and "Night and Day." The trial court rendered
summary judgment for Porter.
The appellate court required proof of two factors to establish copyright
infringement: "(a) that the defendant copied from the plaintiffs copyrighted work
and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to constitute
improper appropriation." 4 Proof of copying may be shown by direct evidence,
such as an admission, or circumstantial evidence. The most common form of
circumstantial evidence is access, but "if there are no similarities, no amount of
evidence of access will suffice to prove copying." 5 On the other hand, "if there is
evidence of access and some similarities exist, then the trier of facts must
determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying."6 One may use
2 Jon Pareles, Critic's Notebook,- A Zillion Dollar Question Who Did What in a Song? N.Y. TIMES, April 28,
1988, at C21 (inspired by a suit in which a court found that a song by Mick Jagger did not infringe on one
written by Patrick Alley, a reggae singer).
3 154 F.2d 464 (2d. Cir. 1946).
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analysis (often called dissection by the courts) and expert testimony in determining
copying. "If evidence of access is absent, the similarities must be so striking as to
preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently arrived at the
same result." 7
Once copying has been proven, the court must determine whether that
copying is unlawful; that is, whether a sufficient portion of protected material has
been copied. "On that issue. . . the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer;
accordingly, on that issue, 'dissection' and expert testimony are irrelevant." "  [I]f
copying is otherwise shown, proof of improper appropriation need not consist of
similarities which, standing alone, would support an inference of copying." 9
Using this approach, the court examined the parties' works. The court
believed that recordings of the compositions exposed similarities, but that these
similarities by themselves were insufficient to infer copying. However, the court
reasoned that, if evidence of access existed, a jury might infer that the similarities
were not coincidental. Since there was some possibility of access and since
plaintiffs credibility was a question for the jury, a genuine issue of material fact
existed on the question of copying.'0
On the issue of whether the copying constituted improper appropriation, the
court stated:
[t]he plaintiff's legally protected interest is not, as such, his
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial
returns from his compositions which derive from the lay public's
approbation of his efforts. The question, therefore, is whether
defendant took from plaintiffs works so much of what is pleasing
to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom
such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully
appropriated something that belonged to the plaintiff.I
This determination is particularly appropriate for a jury.
Based on the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the appellate court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.12 The court, however, did not
preclude the possibility of summary judgment in infringement actions-- cases
71ad
8 Id
9 /d at 469.
10 Id
II Idt at 473.
12 Arnstein lost on remand. 158 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1946).
Summer, 19921
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could exist in which the absence of similarities is so patent as to make summary
judgment appropriate. 13
The main flaw in Arnstein is the application of its rules to the facts.14 The
court stated that there were similarities between the pairs of compositions, but that
standing alone these similarities were insufficient to infer copying. 15 But the court
then declared that if there is some evidence of access, the jury may infer that these
similarities are not coincidental. This author believes that this statement is illogical.
Access, especially the weak evidence of access presented in Arnstein, cannot create
similarity. There must be sufficient similarity between the pieces to raise the
possibility of copying (i.e., that the jury could infer copying from the similarities),
before access becomes relevant. If works are not similar enough that copying is
possible, then no amount of access can infer copying.
The court's analysis of access is also questionable. The lower court
characterized Arnstein's statements on access as "fantastic." For example, Arnstein
had declared that Porter had hired "stooges" to follow him and live in his
apartment. On the other hand, the court of appeals thought that the real question
was credibility, which is an issue for the jury. However, the proper question was
not credibility, but whether the evidence, after eliminating Arnstein's wild and
unsupported allegations, was sufficient to allow a jury to infer a reasonable
possibility of access. The court could have decided this issue as a matter of law, as
the lower court did.
Test for Copyright Infringement
While one may criticize Arnstein's application of the rules to the facts, it
settled the standard for proving copying when there is no direct evidence of
infringement-- access and similarity. 16 It also raised the issue of the role of expert
testimony in establishing copying. The discussion below will divide the analysis of
how courts determine copying into the two parts set forth in Arnstein-- access and
similarity.
1 3 1d
14 For other criticism of Arnstein, see Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in
Music Copyright Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L REV. 127 (1988). This article is especially critical
Cf Arnstein's use of expert testimony only on the issue of copying, rather than employing it for both the
issue of copying and the ultimate issue of whether the copying constitutes infringement; see also Raphael
Metzger, Name that Tune: A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of Musical Plagiarim, 5 LO. LA. ENT. L.J. 61,
70-71 (1985).
15 In his dissent, Judge Clark found no significant similarities. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 476 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
16 Many courts hold that evidence of access and substantial similarity create a rebuttable presumption of
copying. E-g., Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1988); Walker v.
Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); Novak v.
National Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
[Vol 26:1
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1. Access
Most courts consider access a significant element of proof of copying. 17 In
fact, Selle v. Gibb declares that it is the most important component of
circumstantial evidence of copying. 8 Yet, courts disagree whether proof of access
is always required, what access is, and what constitutes proof of access.
a. Can access be proven from striking similarity?
Some courts state that there can be no inference of copying without proof of
access. 19 Other courts declare that access can be inferred from striking similarity. 20
Selle, which involved the Bee Gees' song "How Deep is Your Love," tends
toward the former position.21 The court admitted that "inference of access may still
be established circumstantially by proof of similarity which is so striking that the
possibility of independent creation, coincidence and prior common source are, as a
practical matter, precluded." 22 However, the court added that "striking similarity is
just one piece of circumstantial evidence tending to show access and must not be
considered in isolation." z
Selle states that there must be evidence of access, other than striking
similarity, "which would establish a reasonable possibility that the complaining
work was available to the alleged infringer." ' This is because "two works may be
identical in every detail, but, if the alleged infringer created the accused work
independently or both works were copied from a common source in the public
domain, then there is no infringement."25 The court felt that "although it had
frequently been written that striking similarity alone can establish access, the
decided cases suggest that this circumstance would be most unusual." 6 The court
concluded that "[t]he plaintiff must always present sufficient evidence to support a
reasonable possibility of access because the jury cannot draw an inference of
17 Access may be defined as the opportunity that an alleged infringer had to view or hear the copyrighted
work. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Selle v. Gibb, 567 F.
Supp. 1173, 1181 (N.D. Ill. 1983), affd, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
18 741 F.2d at 901.
19 E-g., Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 974 (11th Cir. 1986); Zimmerman v. Tennille, 1988
Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 126,267 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
20 Fg., Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1988); Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468
(2d Cir. 1946); Allen v. Walt Disney Productions, 41 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
21 741 F.2d at 896.
2 2 k1 at 901.
23 Id
241 (emphasis in original).
2 5 /d
26 l (emphasis in original).
Summer, 1992]
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access based upon speculation and conjecture alone."27 "[A] defendant's
opportunity to view the copyrighted work must exist by a reasonable possibility--
not a bare possibility."''
In Zimmerman v. Tennille, a case involving the Captain and Tennille, the
plaintiff had argued that striking similarity was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
fact despite the lack of any evidence of access3 9 The plaintiffs expert had testified
that portions of the songs were identical, and that the possibility of independent
creation was remote. While recognizing that striking similarity could sometimes
create an inference of access, the court held that striking similarity, could not
produce such an inference "when the evidence affirmatively negates access."' 3
The case of Gaste v. Kaiserman, involving the song "Feelings," disagrees
with Selle and similar cases, and exemplifies those cases that infer access from
striking similarity. 3' The court wrote that "[i]f two works are so strikingly similar
as to preclude the possibility of independent creation, 'copying' may be proved
without a showing of access." 2 The appellant had argued that allowing striking
similarity to infer access fails to protect an author who independently creates his
work. The court countered by stating that "the jury is only permitted to infer access
from striking similarity; it need not do so."33 The court then declared that "[a]
plaintiff has not proved striking similarity sufficient to sustain a finding of copying
if the evidence as a whole does not preclude any reasonable possibility of
independent creation. " 4
Gaste's position-- that access can be inferred from striking similarity -- is
surely correct. ' If two complicated pieces have exactly the same melodies and
accompaniments, one must have been copied from the other. The question, then, is
how strikingly similar the works must be. Again, Gaste is correct that they must
be so strikingly similar as to "preclude any reasonable possibility of independent
creation."
2 7 1V
2 8 Id at 902 (citing Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp. 198, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1980)).
29 Zimmerman, 1988 Copyright L. Dec. 126, 267 at 21,800.
301ad
31 863 F.2d at 1067-78.
321ad at 1068 (quoting Ferguson v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1987); see also
Siskind v. Newton-John, 1987 Copyright L. Dec. (CCII) [26,113 at 21,102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
33 Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1068.
3 4 1d
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b. Access in general
Cases vary greatly on what can constitute access. Some cases require only
the slightest possibility of access, while others require proof of direct access. Cases
also differ significantly on what can comprise evidence of access.
In Gaste, the plaintiffs theory of access was that the defendant composer's
publisher, Fermata, received a copy of the infringed piece, "Pour Toi," in the
1950's when the plaintiff was trying to market the song. 31 A former employee of
Gaste had given a recording of "Pour Toi" to Lebendiger, owner of Fermata, in the
1950's, and Gaste had sent sheet music to Lebendiger in Brazil. The defendant
composer, Kaiserman, then allegedly obtained it from Lebendiger in 1973.
Regarding access, the court wrote that "it is well established that there must
be evidence of a reasonable possibility of access. Access must be more than a bare
possibility and may not be inferred through speculation or conjecture." 37 The court
admitted that the plaintiffs theory was based on an attenuated chain of events, but it
believed that a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant had had access to
the plaintiffs song. The court stated that "[aiccess through third parties connected
to both a plaintiff and a defendant may be sufficient to prove a defendant's access
to a plaintiffs work." 38 The court also pointed out that an infringer is more likely to
steal from an obscure song.
The court, by allowing an inference of access based "on an attenuated chain
of events," seems to contradict its requirements of a "reasonable possibility of
access" and the fact that "access may not be conferred through speculation and
conjecture." 39 It is possible that the defendant obtained "Pour Toi" through this
attenuated chain. But if this quantum of evidence can satisfy the access
requirement, then perhaps there should be no access requirement.
Selle is converse to Gaste in its application of the standard for access to the
facts. Selle gives examples of direct access, such as where "the work was sent
directly to the defendant ... or a close associate of the defendant."' 4 Concerning
circumstantial evidence, the court stated that a plaintiff could show a reasonable
possibility of access where the piece has been widely disseminated. However, the
plaintiff must meet "some minimum threshold of proof which demonstrates that
36 Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1066.
371,d
381L at 1067 (citing De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862
(1945)).
39 Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1067 n.3 (quoting Gaste v. Kaiserman, No. 86-5671, 1987 WL 14457 (S.D.N.Y. July
19, 1987)).
40741 F.2d at 901.
Summer, 19921
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the inference of access is reasonable."4' The greatest difficulty exists when there is
no direct link between the plaintiffs and defendant's works, but the plaintiffs
"work has been so widely disseminated that it is not unreasonable to infer that the
defendant might have had access to it." 4
Musicians had performed Selle's song two or three times in the Chicago
area, and Selle had sent a tape or lead sheet to eleven music recording or publishing
companies. However, there was no evidence that the Bee Gees or their associates
were in Chicago when the piece was performed, or that they had had access to the
recording or lead sheet. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the
possibility of access was "de minimis." 1
An examination of other cases demonstrates that courts have not established
a clear standard for access. Several cases declare that wide-spread dissemination
permits an inference of access."4 In Abko Music v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., the
plaintiff alleged that George Harrison had copied "My Sweet Lord" from the
plaintiffs "He's So Fine." Harrison argued that temporal remoteness precluded a
finding of access since six years had elapsed between the composition of "He's So
Fine" and "My Sweet Lord." The court disagreed. In addition to Harrison's
admission that he heard "He's So Fine" in 1963, the court believed that access had
been shown by the wide dissemination of the song. "He's So Fine" had been
number one in the United States for five weeks and on the "Top Thirty Hits" in
Great Britain for seven weeks.
A recent non-music case, Novak v. National Broadcasting, Co., rejects the
expansive view of access contained in Gaste and Harrisongs. 16 In Novak, writers
and producers of comedy skits that were broadcast over WOR-TV, a New York
television station, sued NBC and several persons connected with Saturday Night
Live for infringing comedy skits. The plaintiffs claimed that access was shown
because a tape of the skits had been sent to an NBC executive and because the skits
had been broadcast over local television.
Like several other courts, the Novak Court said that "[t]o support a finding of
access on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must show a reasonable
possibility of access, not a bare possibility."'4 On the issue of access by the
audition tape, the court believed the NBC executive's statement that he had never
41 /Id at 902.
421ad
431a
44 Eg., Abko Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1983); Miller Brewing
Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 438 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)(Widespread
telecasting of commercial in United States demonstrates access by producer of Canadian commercials).
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seen the tape and that he had a policy of handling such tapes without viewing
them. 47 On the issue of access through broadcasting, the court believed that,
although the skits had been broadcast, there was no evidence that the defendants
had viewed the broadcasts." The court distinguished Harrisongs on the ground
that in that case, the plaintiffs song had been number one for five weeks in the
United States and seven weeks in Great Britain. In Novak, the skits were only
broadcast four times over local television. 4 However, this author does not view
this distinction of degree as significant.
In Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., which involved "I'd Like to Teach the World
to Sing," the plaintiff claimed that access was satisfied because the song's principal
writer had travelled extensively throughout the country at the time the plaintiff was
popularizing his song through public performances. ) The plaintiff also claimed
that one of the song's writers had been a record company executive when the
plaintiff had sent copies of his song to various music publishers and recording
companies.
The court held that these facts did not constitute proof of access. The plaintiff
had not shown that the defendant had been in the places where the work had been
performed. Moreover, the plaintiff had not sent the piece to the defendant's
company, and there was no evidence that one of the companies to which it had
been sent had forwarded it to the defendant.
Similarly, in Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., the evidence showed that the
plaintiff had never had any contact with the defendant, the defendant had never
been to California, and the plaintiffs piece had never been performed outside
California. a Moreover, the plaintiffs composition had "a very narrow field in the
United States."52 Based on this lack of evidence of access, the court found for the
defendant
Contrary to Harrisongs, some courts emphasize the time element in
determining access. 53 In Carew v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., the court felt that a
period of eleven years between the composition of the songs, and the fact that
plaintiffs song had never been published, made access unlikely. 4 The court found
4 7 d. at 169.
48 at 169-70.49/ad
50 795 F.2d 973,975 (11th dCir. 1986).
5151 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
521d at233.
53 Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940); Northern Music Corp. v. King Record
Distributing Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Carew v. RICO. Radio Pictures, Inc., 43 F. Supp.
199, 200 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
54 Contra Abko Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1984); Gaste v. Kaiserman,
863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988).
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similarly in Darrell. However, Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing
Co., makes the odd statement that "[p]riority of publishing of itself raises a
presumption that the defendant had contact." 1 If other courts had adopted this ill-
reasoned presumption, copyright infringement cases would be more frequent.
c. Evaluation
The above discussion demonstrates that there is considerable disagreement
and confusion concerning access. However, the main problem is not the lack of a
clear standard for evaluating access, but whether there should be an access
requirement at all.
It is doubtful that an inference of access adds much to a finding of similarity.
Numerous cases correctly hold that access without similarity cannot constitute
infringement. -6 Summary judgment is proper if the court determines as a matter of
law that two works are not similar, despite a genuine factual dispute regarding
access. On the other hand, as has been discussed above, many cases allow an
inference of access based solely on striking similarity.
Take the situation where a composition has been widely disseminated. Some
courts view this as a significant fact in inferring access. 57 But the fact that a work
has been widely disseminated does not mean that the alleged infringer heard it or,
if he did hear it, that he remembered it. In today's society with a multitude of media
outlets and kinds of entertainment, it is hard to determine what percentage of the
population may have heard a particular song.
Take the opposite scenario. Supppose the defendant has presented
substantial evidence of lack of access, but the melodies of the two songs are
identical. Are we to say that the plaintiff cannot recover without at least looking at
what the probability of independent creation is?
If access is to be used as a major criteria in inferring copying, the standard
should be a reasonable opportunity for access. Courts should not accept the
tenuous evidence offered by plaintiffs in such cases as Gaste and Arnstein to
establish access.
The main use of access is probably for summary judgment. If songs are not
similar, and there is no possibility of access, then summary judgment should be
rendered for the defendant. Additionally, access may be useful when it is direct
55 105 F. Supp. at 398.
56 g., Arc Music Corp. v. Lee, 296 F.2d 186, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1961). However, the Ninth Circuit has
declared that a higher degree of proof of access "justifies a lower standard of proof to show substantial
similarity." Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531,534 (9th Cir. 1990), modified, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
5 7 See cases cited supra note 44.
[Vol. 26:1
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evidence rather than simply circumstantial. A jury should be allowed to examine
direct evidence of access while considering infringement. Still, similarity should be
the main factor in judging copying. Even if the defendant held the plaintiffs music
in his hands while he was writing his song, there can be no inference of copying
without similarity. There is no infringement when a defendant is inspired by a
plaintiffs composition, as long as there is no illegal copying. 5
2. Probative Similarity
The other prong of the standard test for copyright infringement is probative
similarity.59 As was true of access, the tests and standards for probative similarity
differ radically.
Determining copying based on probative similarity is difficult. As one court
has declared, "[w]ith the relatively few musical intervals that exist and the vast
amount of music in the public domain it is rash to infer that a sequence that may be
found in a melody is copied from any particular song containing the same
sequence, rather than taken from other sources."60 Despite this problem, courts
have developed ways to judge similarity.
a. Prior art
Several cases form a negative inference of copying from the fact that the
materials that are similar between two works are also contained in earlier works. 61
In Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., the court found that a sequence of
four notes that was common to the two compositions was also present in earlier
works. 62 In Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, the source of similar phrases in two
compositions was said to be Strauss's "Die Fledermaus." 6
58 Black v. Gosdin, 740 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)(country song lyrics). The court printed the
texts of the two songs in an appendix. Although the two lyrics concern the same subject and create the
same mood, the texts of the songs contain no similarities. Even if the defendant was inspired by the
plaintiffs lyrics, there can be no infringement. Mood and subject matter resemble ideas; they are not
copyrightable.
59 I have borrowed the term "probative similarity" from an article by Alan Latman, 'Probative Similarity'
as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187
(1990). Most courts and commentators use the term "substantial similarity." E.g., 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01[B] at 13-8; § 13.03[A] at 13-23 (1992). I believe that
the term probative similarity is preferable because substantial is a quantitative term. The initial question
for infringement is not how much has been copied, but whether there has been copying. I retain
"substantial similarity" when a court or commentator uses the term.
60 Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1943).
61 Eg., Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1976); Darrell, 113 F.2d
at 80; Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); McMahon v. Harms, 42 F. Supp.
779, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Perlman v. Remick Music Corp., 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 227, 228-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1944); Firsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816, 817-18 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
62 532 F.2d at 721.
63 17 F. Supp. at 817-18.
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The above cases ignore rules of logic and basic principles of copyright law.
That two similar pieces resemble a third earlier piece does not prove that the two
works were not copied from each other.64 Originality for copyright only means that
a work must be from the mind of the author, that the author created it by his own
skill, labor, and judgment. 6 "The originality requirement for obtaining a copyright
is an extremely low threshold... a showing of virtually any independent creativity
will do." 6 Moreover, there is no requirement of novelty or invention as there is
with patents.67
Even a compilation, such as a yellow pages directory, can receive copyright
protection. Thus, if a composer in 1992 were to write a symphony exactly like
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, without having copied Beethoven's work, he could
obtain a copyright in his composition. 69 Of course, the composer could not prevent
anyone from playing Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, but he could stop someone
from playing his own. 70 Thus, the proper inquiry is not whether the Cefen-dant
might have copied the passage from an earlier piece, but whether he copied
plaintiffs work. 71
One could argue that some cases did not employ prior works to directly
negate copying, but rather used them to show that the shared material was
common place or trivial. This proposition can still deprive a composer of copyright
protection. A composer has a right to copyright protection if his work is original,
even if it is commonplace; 72 songs with commonplace melodies frequently
become big hits. A composer can even obtain copyright protection if his piece
64 Of course, when the evidence indicates that the alleged infringing work was copied from a composition
in the public domain, it has been proven that copyright infringement has not occurred. See Heim v.
Universal Pictures Co., 51 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
65 !g., Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp., 197 F. Supp 940, 944 (S.D. Cal. 1961), affd, 304 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1962).
66 Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988).
67 !g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669
(1936); see also Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1066.
68 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1992); see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1282
(1991).
6 9 Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
70 Harttield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1937)(if plaintiff copied from defendant's work, the
existence of a prior source is irrelevant to whether copying has occurred); Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc.,
208 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1949), vacated by, 221 P.2d 95 (Cal. 1950) (that defendant could have taken
material from prior work is irrelevant, if defendant copied plaintiffs song).
71 Of course, if the defendant claims that he copied from an existing work in the public domain, evidence
of prior art is relevant to prove that copying has not occurred. See Novack v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 752 F.
Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Rizzi v. Robbins Music Corp., 58 U.S.P.Q. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
7 2 See Levine v. McDonald's Corp., 735 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic
Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 285, 287-88 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,
191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951). However, some cases state that ordinary elements are not subject to
copyright protection. E.g., Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
[Vol. 26:1
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss1/2
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF MUSICAL COMPOSrIONS
consists entirely of non-copyrightable materials, as long as he has arranged or used
these elements in an original way. 73
b. Ordinary listener test
Many courts have adopted the average observer (or, in music, the ordinary
listener test).74 Sometimes courts use this test to determine copying; sometimes, to
establish illegal appropriation, as in the Arnstein case. When used to determine
copying, courts find probative similarity only if the average listener can hear the
probative similarity. Courts employing this test distrust expert testimony. As one
court stated: technical analysis "is not the proper approach to a solution: it must be
more ingenuous, more like that of a spectator, who would rely upon the complex
of his impressions. ,75 As noted above, some courts believe that the proper focus is
on the plaintiffs financial interest. "The plaintiffs legally protected interest is not,
as such, his reputation as a musician but his interest in financial returns from his
compositions which derive from the lay public's approbation of his efforts." 76
At first glance, the ordinary listener test has several advantages. It brings in
the reasonable man, so greatly beloved in tort law. It also avoids experts who can
hoodwink a jury with their eruditeness and learning.
But, those courts that employ the ordinary listener test to establish copying
ignore that the ordinary listener is ill-equipped to hear copying. They also confuse
the purpose of the first prong of the Arnstein test. This purpose is not to determine
whether the ordinary listener can hear the similarity, bt whether there has been
copying. Some courts have acknowledged that a clever composer-thief can vary a
melody so that the average listener can not be sure whether copying has occurred.77
On the other hand, an educated musician usually can distinguish whether a piece
has been newly composed or is based on an existing one.
Theoretically, if a thief stole the plaintiffs theme and wrote it backwards, the
plaintiff would be entitled to copyright protection. Copying an entire theme is
certainly substantial. In such an event, the ordinary listener would be unable to hear
73 Levine, 735 F. Supp. at 97.
74 Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987) (case
involved the theme from the movie E.T.); Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d
Cir. 1980Xtoys); Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 1093 (2d Cir.
1974)(fabric design); Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1943); Heyman v. Salle,
743 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Jones v. CBS, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 748, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(television script); Carew v. R.I.O., 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1949); Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, 17 F.
Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
7 5 Arnstein, 137 F.2d at 412 (quoting Nicholas v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)) (a similar view concerning the infringement of literary works).
76 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473; see also Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 11l S. CL 511 (1990).
77 Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896,904 (7th Cir. 1984); Blume v. Spear, 30 F. 629, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1887).
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that the theme had been copied. Yet, an educated musician upon examining the
score should be able to discern the copying.
Courts that employ the ordinary listener test find appealing an economic
argument that copyright laws are intended to protect an author's financial interest,
not his reputation. However, this theory does not justify using the ordinary listener
test, even on the question of illegal appropriation. Further, it contradicts
congressional intent as indicated in the copyright law.38 The law provides for
statutory damages without proof of actual damages. "
Still, those courts that are suspicious of expert opinions raise legitimate
concerns. Like most expert witnesses, experts in musical copyright cases
frequently disagree. However, the point is not that copying should not be found if
it requires complex analysis, as the average-listener courts seem to argue. Copying
is copying. Rather, the problem is that unethical analysis can be used to show
similarity and the likelihood of copying where none exists. A rigorous method of
judging substantial similarity, such as the one presented below, can help avoid this
problem.
Sensing some of the problems with the average listener test, the court in
Dawson developed a variation on the test called the "intended audience" test. 8 The
court agreed with Arnstein that copyright law should protect the plaintiff's financial
interest. 81 Yet, the court felt that the ordinary listener test does not always protect
that financial interest; the intended audience is not always the average listener. "[A]
court should not be hesitant to find that the lay public does not fairly represent a
work's intended audience." 8 Therefore, when conducting the second prong of the
Arnstein test -- the unlawful copying prong -- one must determine whether the
piece's intended audience perceives the copying.83 The court remanded the case
because the trial court had not considered the intended audience of the
compositions involved -- spiritual anangements. 84
The intended audience test shares most of the problems of the ordinary
listener test. First, Dawson states that generally the intended audience will be the
78 One court has even stated that the lack of the effect of a play and motion picture on the sale of a
sociological study is one factor in not finding infringement. Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., 197
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Obviously, this is incorrect; the effect of the infringing work's
sales should be considered in calculating damages or a fair use defense, not whether infringement has
occurred.
79 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1988).
80 905 F.2d 731; see also Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in
Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1981).
81 905 F.2d at 736.
82 Id at 737.
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ordinary listener.85 More importantly, the test still ignores that the key inquiry is
whether copying has occurred, not whether the plaintiff has been economically
damaged.
Another problem with the ordinary listener test is that courts using it have
confused or telescoped the two .prongs of the Arnstein test. As stated above,
Arnstein first establishes whether copying has occurred, then determines whether
the quantity copied is sufficient to constitute improper appropriation. According to
Arnstein, expert testimony can be used with the former; the ordinary listener test,
with the latter. Some courts, however, have ignored the distinction between
whether copying has occurred and the quantity copied, and applied the average
listener test to the copying prong.
This confusion may be due to a looseness of terminology by courts
employing the Arnstein test.86 Many courts use the term "substantial" similarity to
describe what this paper calls probative similarity-- similarity that is probative of
whether copying has occurred. The question of whether copying has occurred is
qualitative, not quantitative. Thus, the use of substantial, a quantitative term, is
confusing when applied to the question of whether copying has occurred.
3. Musical Analysis and Opinions of Musical Experts
Numerous musical copyright infringement cases use musical analysis and
expert testimony. This analysis ranges from poor or unsophisticated to complex
and musically insightful.
Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. falls into the former category,
mainly because the plaintiff, using questionable analytical techniques, attempts to
show similarity between patently dissimilar pieces. 87 Despite the plaintiff's
analysis, the court states that the pieces do not sound alike: their melodies,
harmonies, accents, and rhythms are completely different. But then the court goes
too far; it points out that the compositions were written for entirely different
purposes. This last point is irrelevant, as a popular song can be copied from a
sacred piece, or a symphony, from an opera.
The court was correct in rejecting the plaintiffs stretched analysis:
By ingenious manipulation of his composition the plaintiff attempts
to establish similarity. For instance to do so, he transfers notes from
851Id
86 For problems in terminology in copyright cases, see Latman, supra note 59. This article will be
discussed in detail below.
87 52 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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the accompaniment in the bass to the melody in the treble, he omits
and changes notes and rhythms of some of the phrases, and
separates parts of some of his phrases and places them in different
parts of his composition.88
Manipulative analysis of this sort has made courts suspicious of musical experts.
Northern Music first states that it will mainly rely on the average listener
test, but then it goes into an extended and unsound analysis. 1 The court in this case
points out that there are sixteen common notes in the A strains of both
compositions. However, statistical similarity cannot prove copying. It is not the
number of notes that are the same that matters, but the notes' structural significance
and relation to each other.
The court also erred in allowing too many recorded comparisons of the
songs. The plaintiff alone brought in eleven specially-prepared records. It is
legitimate to play the melody or harmony without any accompaniment, but courts
should be wary of being manipulated by clever recordings; musical performance
can make dissimilar pieces sound similar.
Other cases have musically-sophisticated analyses, although sometimes
these cases make significant analytical mistakes. Some cases emphasize the
uniqueness of the compositions. 90 Obviously, if two pieces contain the same rare
trait, the likelihood that one composer copied from the other is greatly increased.
Of course, copying a trite theme is infringement, but proof of that copying is more
difficult than with a rare trait.
In Harrisongs, Harrison himself conceded that the two pieces were
"strikingly similar" when played by a pianist at the trial.9' Equally important, the
court found repetition of a "highly unique pattem."92
Gaste recognized "the limited number of notes and chords available to
composers and the resulting fact that common themes frequently reappear in
various compositions, especially in popular music." Consequently, "striking
similarity between pieces of popular music must exist beyond themes that could
881,d at 115.
89 105 F. Supp. at 393.
90 Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 904 (7th Cir.
1984); Abko Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988,998 (2d Cir. 1983).
91 1d
92Id
93 863 F.2d at 1068.
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have been derived from a common source or themes that are so trite as to reappear
in many compositions." 91
Gaste employed both oral renditions and expert testimony. Gaste's expert
testified that "there is not one measure of 'Feelings' which ... cannot be traced
back to 'Pour Toi."'95 He also found:
[A] unique musical 'fingerprint' that evaded resolution-- it occurred
in the same place in the two songs. The witness said that while
modulation from a minor key to its relative major was very
common, he had never seen this particular method of modulation in
any other composition. 96
However, this author does not agree that the two patterns are similar.97
The defendant's expert attacked the methods of Gaste's expert and
contradicted his conclusions.98 As the court rightly pointed out, deciding which
expert to believe goes to the weight of the evidence and is for the jury to decide.
The problem, though, is how the jury can decide which expert to believe when they
lack the expertise needed to make this determination. The question is not which
expert is more believable, but which expert's method is more accurate in
determining copying.
The defendant also examined prior art to demonstrate that many of the
similarities between the two works also appeared in other compositions.99 But
Gaste's expert stated that the prior works were not substantially similar; and the
court declared that this contrary evidence comprised a question for the jury.
However, as mentioned above, this author does not believe that similarity to prior
works is significant. Similarity between the allegedly infringed and infringing
pieces is noteworthy, but similarity to earlier unrelated compositions is not. This
94 Id. at 1068-69. Of course, this language wrongfully implies that only unique compositions receive
protection.
95 ld at 1068-69.
96 Id at 1068.
97 This author agrees with Gaste's expert that the two patterns are somewhat unique, but I disagree that
they are similar. The patterns are functionally different within the harmony of the two pieces. In "Pour
Toi," a dominant seventh chord on B resolves to C in the key of G major. (The fact that both patterns
occur in G major is irrelevant. A large percentage of popular music is in G major.) Functionally, the
pattern in "Pour Toi" would be diagramed: V7 of vi-VI of vi (IV). In other words the composer is using a
secondary dominant to deceptively resolve to the submediant of tonic; a deceptive resolution being where
a root movement of a second upwards (B-C) replaces the expected resolution of a root movement of a
fourth upwards (B-E). In "Feelings," the pattern is V7 of ii-IlH of ii (IV). This is not a deceptive resolution
(E-F* or B-C), rather it is a root movement by a third (E-C). While this analysis may be foreign to those
not versed in analytical techniques, the point is the analyst must be careful not to find similarities that
don't exist.
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author believes that almost any musical pattern, especially those of popular music,
can be found in prior works.
In Selle, the plaintiff relied almost entirely on the expert testimony of Arrand
Parsons, a well-known musical theorist.10° The Bee Gees, who did not employ an
expert, claimed that Dr. Parsons, although eminent in classical music, was not
equally qualified in popular music. However, the court believed the key point was
that while Dr. Parsons stated that the pieces were strikingly similar, he could not
rule out the possibility of independent creation. In addition, the court believed there
was insufficient evidence to allow an inference of access. Whether the court would
have considered the similarities sufficient to prove substantial similarity remains
unclear.
Although not involving music, Sid & Marty Krofft Television v.
McDonald's Corp. 10 developed a sophisticated, but often criticized, method of
examining copying. The court here points out that "[tihe real task in a copyright
infringement action, then, is to determine whether there has been copying of the
expression of an idea rather than just the idea itself." 102 Consequently, there "must
be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the expression of these
ideas as well." 3
There are two steps in determining substantial similarity under this Ninth
Circuit test. First, one employs an extrinsic test that examines substantial similarity
of ideas. 104 "It is extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the trier of
fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed." 105 One can use
analysis and expert testimony with the extrinsic test, and it can be established as a
matter of law.
The intrinsic test examines the substantial similarity between the forms of
expression. "If there is substantial similarity of ideas, then the trier of fact must
determine whether there is substantial similarity in the expression of the ideas so as
to constitute infringement." t06 This intrinsic test depends on the responses of the
ordinary person; thus, analysis and expert testimony are inappropriate. 107
100 741 F.2d at 904.
101 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). This method has been applied to music in Baxter v. MCA, Inc. 812 F.2d
421 (9th Cir. 1987).
102 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163.1031,d
104 Id at 1164.
105 Id
10 6 1d
107 One might note the similarity between Krofft and Arnstein v. Porter, but Kroffl, while recognizing the
similarity, states that it is not trying to resurrect Arnstein. Id at 1165 n.7.
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The Krofft test uses the important principle that ideas cannot be copyrighted;
only the expression of those ideas receive copyright protection. However, while
this principle is a basic tenet of copyright law, it, at least as expressed in Krofft,
does not form a valid method of establishing copying. Looking first to see whether
there is a similarity of ideas adds an unnecessary step to the analysis. In addition,
when applied to music it is particularly meaningless since it is difficult to decide
what constitutes an idea in music. Moreover, the criticisms applied to the ordinary
listener test also apply to the Krofft test-- it is the existence of copying that matters,
not the reaction of the ordinary listener.
Krofft did note a significant flaw in the defendant's reasoning; the defendant
tried to show the differences in the expression of the pieces and ignored their
similarities. 10 Yet, Krofft could have focused on the similarity, rather than
resorting to its intrinsic test. The court correctly states that the overall impact of a
work is entitled to protection, in addition to the protection of the individual
elements.'1 9 Nevertheless, one can determine the overall impact of a composition
by a reasoned analysis that recognizes the interaction of the elements of a work.
In sum, the cases discussed above range from simplistic or inaccurate
analyses to the use of well-respected experts in music theory. Yet not one of these
cases is completely satisfying to this writer. Even the most sophisticated analyses
appear somewhat suspect. Depending on whether they are to be used for the
plaintiff or the defendant, the analyses seem to start with the proposition that the
songs are (or are not) similar, then they try to build the method of analysis to prove
(or disprove) the similarity. This is putting the cart before the horse. 110 One must
start with a reliable system that can prove similarity or dissimilarity, then proceed
to show whether the pieces have been copied or not.
4. Proof of Independent Creation
A defendant may present evidence of independent creation to counter
evidence of copying. " Of course, a defendant need not present such evidence if
the plaintiff has not established an inference of copying.'1 2 Evidence of
independent creation may comprise an examination of the defendant's creative
process, evidence that the work was written before possibility of access, a recital of
108 Id at 1165.
109 Id. at 1169. This does not mean that the mood created by a piece is copyrightable. Nor does it mean
that a common accompaniment pattern or a style of orchestration is subject to protection.
110 Obviously, such problems are not limited to musical copyright cases. It is for the court to determine
whether a particular test is reliable in proving a fact in dispute or whether the test was developed to prove
the fact in dispute. The key is whether the test is reliable over a wide variety of situations.
I I E.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1984); Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862
F.2d 1063, 1066 (4th Cir. 1988); Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62,
66 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
112 Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982).
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a defendant's musical training, or any other evidence that indicates that the
defendant did not copy the plaintiff s work. 13 Evidence of independent creation is
not an affirmative defense, but rather comprises rebuttal evidence to the plaintiffs
case. 1 4 Courts sometimes require a "high standard of proof of independent
creation where the plaintiff has clearly established access and substantial
similarity." 115
Evidence of independent creation will often consist of the testimony of the
defendant or his colleagues. This obviously presents a question of credibility for
the fact finder.'16
5. Amount Copied
Most courts do not discuss how much copying is required to find
infringement; rather, they focus on whether copying has occurred. This is probably
because if there is not substantial copying, it is difficult to discern that copying has
occurred. Moreover, the effect of the amount of copying on liability is usually dealt
with in the fair use defense.
A few courts do confront this question. As discussed earlier, the amount
copied is part of the Arnstein test. The Ninth Circuit has declared that it is not the
amount copied that is important, but whether the portion copied is qualitatively
important.' 17 One court has stated that copying a horror movie slogan is
infringement because of a slogan's significance. 118 Similarly, copying one phrase
of a song can constitute inifngement.119 This author believes that the test of
whether sufficient copying has occurred to find liability is both qualitative and
quantitative.
A related issue is whether the portion copied is subject to copyright
protection. The copied portion may be in the public domain or consist of
uncopyrightable material, such as a simple chord progression or rhythmic pattern.
113 NIMMER, supra note 59, at § 13.01[B] at 13-9, 13-10; Selle, 741 F.2d at 903; Intersong-USA v. CBS,
Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 280-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Black v. Gosdin, 740 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (M.D. Tenn.
1990). Intersong-USA involved evidence that an early version of defendants' song existed prior to the
composition of the plaintiffs song.
114 Keeler, 862 F.2d at 1066; Novak v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 752 F. Supp. 164, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Flag Fables, Copy L. Rep. (CCH) 126,533.
1 15 NlMMER.supra note 59, at 13.01[B] at 13-9.
116 Some of the reasons courts put forth for believing one expert over another are suspicious. Intersong-
USA, 757 F. Supp. at 280, believed defendant's expert because he was less of a "cheerleader."
117 Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987).
118 Dawn Associates v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 831, 835 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
119 Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
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There is no infringement when the only similarities between two works involve
non-copyrightable elements.120
PART Two
Other Commentators on Problems of Musical Copyright Infringement
A few commentators have criticized the way courts have approached
problems of musical copyright infringement. A. Keyt attacks the application of
concepts concerning movies, books, and cartoons to cases involving music. 121
Keyt, rather than trying to determine where and when the line of "too similar is
crossed," tries to deal with the problem at the remedy stage. 122 He advocates
apportioning profits based on the musically creative contribution to the work,
ignoring the drawing power of the artist. 123
Keyt's approach is difficult to apply. It is hard to decide what contribution
may take a composition from being banal to unique. Moreover, success is often
based on luck. The artist that records the song, the timing of the release, or the
artist's connections in the musical community may be just as important as the
quality of the song. In addition, the author relies too heavily on classical analysis:
that Handel may make changes in a composition that would alter it from being
banal to great does not mean that Morris Albert ("Feelings") can.
Keyt also advocates compulsory licensing rather than enjoining the
infringement because of society's interest in new compositions.124 But this
argument ignores an artist's right to control his work. Colorizing an old movie may
seem better to some, but to the original artists-- the director, actors, and writers --
such changes may destroy their conceptions.
R Metzger recommends using expert testimony to determine copying, and
believes that similarity alone can establish copying. 25 He states:
The best available evidence on the issue of independent creation is
undoubtedly testimony of experts in musical composition. For this
reason it has been held that such testimony is required when a
plaintiff seeks to establish copying without proof of access. What
the Bee Gees Court [Selle] failed to recognize is that substantial and
1 2 0 Levine v. McDonald's Corp., 735 F. Supp. 92,96 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
121 Aaron Keyt, Comment, An Improved Framework for Musical Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV.
421,463 (1988).
122 d at 443.
12 3 id at 454-56.
124 ld at 456-63.
125 Metzger, supra note 14, at 66.
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striking similarity, coupled with expert testimony which negates
independent creation, is substantial evidence upon which a finding
of infringement may be based, even in the absence of direct proof of
access.
126
Metzger criticizes existing tests for ascertaining copyright infringement.127
Instead, he advocates musicologist Jan La Rue's style-analytical approach that
considers all aspects of a composition-- sound, harmony, melody, rhythm, and
growth (form). 28 Using this system, he compares "My Sweet Lord" with "He's
So Fine" and finds copying.
While this author applauds Metzger's adoption of a well-established system
in testing infringement, I believe that he has chosen the wrong system.
Undoubtedly, La Rue's analytical system is a highly respected method of studying
musical compositions. But his system is not well-suited for the purpose for which
Metzger tries to use it-- determining authorship. La Rue has turned to a different
method-- a quantitative approach that examines the correlation of certain musical
rhythms-- when he has been faced with problems of musical authorship. '-
La Rue's analytical system is mainly employed to discern the style of a
composer, genre, or period. It is ill-suited to compare two compositions to try to
determine whether one has been copied from the other. Moreover, his system is
intended for use with classical music, especially eighteenth-century music, not
modem popular music. Furthermore, its emphasis on examining all parameters of
musical style does not help much with musical infringement problems. If a
composer has stolen all portions of another composition, the theft will be obvious
and analysis will be unnecessary.
This author views Metzger's comparison of "My Sweet Lord" and "He's So
Fine" as unsatisfying. Many of the elements he finds to be shared by the pieces--
principal intervals of a fourth and identical phrase structures-- are common in pop
music. Still, Metzger's goal of developing a more rigorous approach to copyright
infringement of musical compositions is commendable.
Alan Latman criticizes those courts that, applying the Arnstein test, use the
term "substantial similarity" to refer to the similarity that is required, along with
access, to infer copying. 130 Instead, he proposes the term, "probative similarity."' 31
1261Id
127 Id at 71-96.
128 ld at 96-101. See also Jan La Rue, GUIDELINES FOR STYLE ANALYSIS (1970).
129 Eg., Mozart Authentication by Activity Analysis: A Progress Report, MOZART-JAHRBUCH 1978/79, 209-
214; Mozart or Dittersdorf MOZART-JAHRBUCH 1971fl2,40-49.
130 See Latman, supra note 59.
131 Id. at 1190.
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Professor Latman first presents the elements that are necessary for a finding
of infringement:
1) "The defendant must have seen or heard the plaintiffs
work at some time prior to creating his or her own work and have
used plaintiffs work in some fashion as a model;"
2) "The material copied by defendant from plaintiff's
work must be such as enjoys protection under copyright;" and
3) "Not only must defendant copy, rather than
independently create, and not only must he or she copy protected
material, but also such protected material must be 'substantial.' "132
Latman next points out that substantial should describe only the third
requirement. In other words,
'substantial similarity,' while said to be required for indirect proof of
copying, is actually required only after copying has been established
to show that enough copying has taken place. A similarity, which
may or may not be substantial, is probative of copying if, by
definition, it is one that under all circumstances establishes an
inference of copying. 133
Arnstein does not use the term "substantial" with either prong of its test.
Rather, it was first used by the same court in a case decided five days after
Arnstein-- Heim v. Universal Pictures Company-- 34 with the unlawful
appropriation prong of Arnstein. 31 While the usage of the term is clear in Heim,
later courts transplanted it to the first prong of Arnstein.
Latman explains that the similarity required to prove copying need not be
substantial; rather, it must justify an inference of copying. 13
In an appropriate case, copying might be demonstrated, with no
proof or weak proof of access, by showing that a single brief
phrase, contained in both pieces, was so idiosyncratic in its
treatment as to preclude coincidence. 37
132 1d. at 1189.
133 Id. at 1189-90.
134 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
135 Latman, supra note 59, at 1197 ("(b) that, if copying is proved, it was so 'material' or 'substantial' as
to constitute unlawful appropriation.") Id
1 3 6 
Id at 1191.
137 Id. at 1197 (citing Helm v. Universal Pictures, 154 F.2d 480,485 (2d Cir. 1946)).
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In addition, the copying of uncopyrightable elements may help prove copying of
protected elements. 131
In sum, Latman's article criticizes the way some courts use the term
"substantial similarity" in the test for inferring copying. It also presents a three-part
test for establishing infringement-- 1) copying, 2) copying of protected elements,
and 3) substantial copying. Most importantly, it creates the term "probative
similarity," which refers to similarities that justify an inference of copying.
PART THREE
A Proposal for a More Rigorous Method of Determining Copyright Infringement
of Musical Compositions
The above disucssion has criticized existing methods of determining
copyright infringement of musical compositions. First, this author disagrees with
the importance many courts place on a possibility of access. I believe that a
possibility of access standing alone means nothing, and that a possibility of access
adds little to a showing of probative similarity. Access is only probative when it is
certain or likely that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs work, or where a
lack of access combined with a lack of similarity permits a summary judgment.
Second, this author agrees with Latman's criticism of using the term "substantial
similarity" in regard to whether copying has occurred. Third, this author feels that
some courts' reliance on prior art is misplaced. The question is whether one
composer copied from another, not whether a composer could have copied from a
prior piece. Fourth, this author believes that the ordinary listener test is not a valid
test of copying; establishing whether the ordinary listener can discern copying does
not prove or disprove illegal copying. Finally, this author believes that the
analytical methods used by courts and experts have not been rigorous enough. If
analysis is to be employed (and it will have to be used absent direct proof of
copying), then the method of analysis must be able to accurately discern copying.
In other words, the reliability of the analytical method must be beyond question.
Several musicologists, mainly working with eighteenth century music, have
developed methods of determining authorship based on style. 139 These methods
138 Latman, supra note 59, at 1095.
139 See, e.g., E. Scott Fruehwald, Authenticity Problems in Joseph Haydn's Early Instrumental Works: A
Stylistic Investigation (1988); The Authenticity of the Symphony in A Minor (K16a) Attributed to Mozart: A
Stylistic Study, 28 COLLEG Music SYMPOSIuM 24 (1988); A Method For Determining Authenticity by Style,
V J. Music. R. 297 (1985). See La Rue, supra note 128; M. Paymer, The Instrumental Music Attributed to
Giovanni Battista Pergolesi: A Study in Authenticity (1977); E. Wolf, Authenticity and Stylistic Evidence in
the Early Symphony: A Conflicting Attribution between Richter and Stamitz, in E. Clinkscale, ed., A Musical
Offering (1977). See also D. Brantley, Disputed Authorship of Musical Works: A Quantitative Approach to
the Attribution of the Quartets Published as Haydn's Opus3 (1977); W. Paisley, Identifying the Unknown
Communicator in Painting, Literature, and Music: The Significance of Minor Encoding Habits, 14 1
COMMUNICATION 219 (1964). 1 would define style as the materials-- melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, etc.--
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are systematic approaches and concentrate on minor aspects of a composer's style,
"hidden communicators" that remain constant from piece to piece. Several of the
methods use quantitative or statistical techniques.
This author's method consists of looking at minor details of style and
examining musical rhythms, such as harmonic rhythm or the rate of textual
change.40 The key to this method is its scientific approach: it looks not only at the
work or works whose authorship is in question, but also at a control group whose
authorship is definitively established. The method tests and retests compositions,
and provides a margin of error.
The above approaches to musical authorship probably cannot be applied to
the present problem. They were developed for classical music, which is
stylistically more complex than popular music. More importantly, they were
created to determine whether a composition is by a particular composer or not, or
which of two composers wrote a piece. They were not developed to show that one
work was partially copied from another; they probably cannot deal with the
situation where a piece may be by two composers. A composer might combine the
purloined material with his unconscious communicators.
Still, from a practical viewpoint, courts must determine whether copying has
occurred. The approach suggested below, while not as rigorous nor as reliable as
the methods briefly described above, draws on the above approaches to attempt to
develop a method that will accurately establish infringement.
A test for determining whether one composition has been copied from
another must be rigorous. The analyst must carefully compare the similarities
between the works, and decide the significance of those similarities. The analyst
should not only note the similarities between pieces, but show how the similar
passages function within the structure of the compositions. Moreover, the analyst
should consider whether other factors, such as the rhythmic structure of the text,
can explain the similarities.
A major problem with most experts' analyses is that they limit their inquires
to the alleged infringed and infringing compositions. 141 A proper approach would
that a composer usually employs, combined with the frequency of the use of those materials and the ways
these materials interact and are organized.
140 A detailed description of my method is beyond the scope of this article. The brief description I give
herein is intended to serve as background to my suggested approach to establishing copyright infringement
of musical works.
141 Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) points out that Iglesias had
used a descending scale step motive in other songs, and that many of the other elements shared by the
songs were based on common compositional techniques.
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also examine all other available works by the alleged infringer. 142 By looking at
other pieces by the defendant, the analyst can discern whether the defendant might
have written the alleged infringing work. In other words, is the alleged infringing
passage in the defendant's style?
Another important inquiry is the extent to which the material shared by the
pieces is common to the style of the genre (type of piece). 143 Certain types of
melodies, harmonies, phrase structures, or other musical elements are common to
particular genres or styles. For example, triadic melodies (C-E-G) are common in
popular music. Likewise, phrase structures of 4 measures, 4 measures, 4
measures, 4 measures is the usual structure of pop music. That pieces have similar
triadic melodies arranged in four measure phrases does not necessarily indicate
copying.
An examination of the defendant's other works combined with an
understanding of the style of the genre of the relevant compositions makes the
probative similarity test more rigorous. A proper approach to probative similarity
would begin by listing all similarities between the alleged infringing and infringed
pieces. The analyst would then show how the similarities function within the
structure of the pieces. The analyst would next examine other compositions by the
defendant to determine whether the similarities are common to the defendant's
style, and decide whether to eliminate them from the list. The analyst would next
examine the similarities to see whether they are common to the genres or styles the
composers are using. He would not necessarily eliminate those elements that are
common to the genre or style, but he would consider this fact when he is
evaluating the significance of the similarities.
The final step in establishing copying is to determine the significance of the
similarities that remain on the list. The principal question is whether these
similarities are sufficient to infer copying. In other words, do the similarities
constitute evidence that would allow a jury to find that copying has occurred? The
analyst may also consider differences between the works, but the differences
should not be overemphasized.
Of course, probative similarity is not the only factor to consider in
establishing infringement. If the plaintiff produces direct evidence of copying, then
that evidence is as important or more important than probative similarity.
Likewise, if the defendant presents evidence of independent creation, that evidence
can prove lack of infringement.
142 This inquiry should probably be limited to pieces earlier than the alleged infringing work since the
style of the alleged infringing piece may become part of the alleged infringer's style.
143 This is what some courts are trying to do when they examine prior art, but this approach avoids much
of the confusion that is created by looking at prior art.
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This author believes that a plaintiffs burden in proving infringement should
be high. As stated above, a party is not liable for copyright infringement unless he
has copied another's work. Consequently, considering the limited range of
materials used in most pop music, infringement should be found only with clear
and convincing evidence.
1. Comparison of "My Sweet Lord" and "He's So Fine"
A comparison of George Harrison's "My Sweet Lord" and Ronald Mack's
"He's So Fine" will illustrate the above method. The gross form (organization of
melodic materials) of both songs is relatively simple. One can diagram the gross
form of "He's So Fine" as A-B-A 1-B1-C-B2 -A2 -CODA, and the gross form of
"My Sweet Lord" as A-B-A 1 (C)-B 1-A I (C)-CODA.144 These forms are common
in popular music.
The A sections of "My Sweet Lord" and "He's So Fine" contain probative
similarities. The motives (kernels of the melody) are similar; the contours of both
are descending fourths (Bb-F and G-D). Moreover, the rhythms of the melodies
are similar: both involve syncopation, and the patterns of both are basically long-
short-long.
There are significant differences between the motives. "My Sweet Lord"
consists of four pitches (Bb-A-G-F), while "He's So Fine" comprises only three
(G-E-D). One might argue, however, that while this is a difference of detail, the
background structures of the melodies are the same.
The rhythms of the motives also exhibit differences. While both motives
employ syncopation, the syncopation is used in different ways. Most significantly,
in "He's So Fine" there is syncopation over the downbeat, while in "My Sweet
Lord" there is not.
The harmonies supporting the motives are different. "He's So Fine" consists
of a chord progression of d7 min-G7 (a root relationship of a 4th up), while "My
Sweet Lord" consists of a progression of Bb-f min (a root relation of a 5th up).
Also, the harmonies change at different points in the melodies.
The combination of the motives into the first phrase group (A) in the songs
is similar. Both songs vary the motives at least twice. The structure of A in "My
Sweet Lord" is a-a I -a2 , while in "He's So Fine" it is a-a 1 -a2 -a3 . However, in the
144 Each letter stands for different melodic material. The use of the superscript with a letter means that
the melodic material is similar but not exactly the same. I have put C in parenthesis on the Harrison song
because this section can be considered either a variant on A or new melodic material. Instrumental
interludes have been ignored in the aboye diagrams.
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Mack tune, there are three varied repetitions of the motive, while in the Harrison
song, there are only two.
There are also probative similarities between the B sections of the songs.
The main motives in the B sections are very similar, especially rhythmically.
Moreover, the underlying harmonies are the same (V7 -I), and the harmonies
change at the same time (on the down beats of the measure).
While the B groups in both works are developed by varying the motives, the
combinations differ. The Harrison B section has a structure of a-a -a2 -b, while the
Mack has a phrase structure of a-a 1 -a2-a3 .
Both songs contain one further motive: the "Hallelujah" motive in "My
Sweet Lord" and the C section motive in "He's So Fine." These motives do not
resemble each other.
In sum, the probative similarities between "My Sweet Lord" and "He's So
Fine" appear in the motives of the A and B sections. 45
An examination of other works by Harrison reveals that he likes to use
syncopated rhythms, although there are no rhythmic patterns exactly like that seen
in "My Sweet Lord" in the same context. Harrison also likes to use descending
melodic patterns to begin phrases. There is a phrase in "For Yer Blues" that is
similar to the "My Sweet Lord" A motive, but it is employed in a different context.
I have found no other motives in Harrison's works from before "My Sweet Lord"
that resemble the B motive.146
In comparing "My Sweet Lord" and "He's So Fine," one is struck by the
greater sophistication, complexity and imagination of the Harrison piece. This
sophistication, complexity and imagination is characteristic of Harrison's music; it
is obvious that Ronald Mack could not have written "My Sweet Lord." However,
this is not a defense to infringement. If Harrison copied "He's So Fine" motives,
even subconsciously, there is copyright infringement. The motivic material of a
composition is its most important trait, and it is protected by the copyright laws.
The similarities of the A motives standing alone are not sufficient to infer
copying. Descending patterns of a 4th are not uncommon. Moreover, while both
employ syncopated rhythms, the use of syncopation is different. Most importantly,
145 The district court's finding that "My Sweet Lord" is the very same song as "He's So Fine" with
different words is ridiculous. Abko Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir. 1983).
While there are significant similarities between the pieces, especially in the melodic material, the works
often differ markedly.
146 1 did not have all of Harrison's works.
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the rhythm of the music may be dictated by the rhythm of the text. Both texts
comprise three words, and the most natural rhythm of both texts is probably long-
short-long.
The song's B motives seem even more similar than the A motives. Again,
standing alone, the similarities of the B sections may be coincidental. However, the
appearance of two sets of similar motives in the pieces is striking, and it is very
unlikely that this is due to coincidence. Accordingly, one may infer that "My Sweet
Lord" is based in part on motivic material from "He's So Fine," and that Harrison
has infringed on the Mack piece, albeit subconsciously.
Possible Solutions to Other Problems Connected with the Infringement of Musical
Compositions
The above has presented a rigorous test for establishing copyright
infringement of musical compositions. Nevertheless, developing a rigorous test
does not solve all problems connected with musical copyright infringement. Even
with the help of musical experts, judges and juries are often not equipped to deal
with problems involving music. Musical judgment requires years to develop and,
to a certain extent, is an inborn talent. In addition, juries may have problems
deciding which expert to believe. The most convincing evidence in evaluating
copying should be that produced by the expert with the most reliable methods, but
juries are ill-equipped to determine which analytical system or analyst is the most
reliable. 147
The easiest solution to this problem would be for the court to appoint its
own experts. This would not make the court more musically knowledgeable, but it
would allow the court to hear an unbiased expert.
Further changes would require radical alterations in the way courts operate.
The ideal solution would be to appoint a musically-educated temporary magistrate.
This magistrate would compare the relevant compositions using a reliable method,
and also hear testimony of the parties' experts. The magistrate would then make
recommendations to the judge who could adopt the magistrate's recommendations,
make his own decision, or ask for further information.
This proposition would involve major changes in the way courts are
structured, and an amendment to the seventh amendment of our Constitution
(unless the parties waived a jury trial). 1411 Still, it would be an ideal solution,
147 Of course, this can be a problem in any complex case.
148 This is not to imply that problems of musical copyright are so unique or so important by themselves as
to require changes in our constitution. This author advocates changes in our court system to deal with the
multitude of problems created by living in a complex and specialized world.
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combining the musical expertise of the temporary magistrate and the legal
expertise of the judge.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to present a proper framework to
determine whether one musical composition has been copied from another. This
paper has discussed and criticized methods courts have adopted to judge copyright
infringement of musical compositions. This author is especially critical of the
emphasis courts have placed on the possibility of access and the lack of rigor
employed by experts and courts in analyzing compositions. This paper has also
examined other commentators' suggestions on how to deal with the problems of
copyright infringement without finding a satisfying solution.
This author has proposed a method of establishing copyright infringement
of musical compositions that relies almost entirely on musical analysis. The
method consists of listing the common elements of the two pieces, eliminating
those elements that are probably part of the defendant's style, deciding whether the
similarities might be caused by the common language or genre of the works, and
determining whether the remaining similarities are sufficient to infer copying. This
paper has also suggested a greater reliance on musical experts, including the court's
appointment of its own expert, and even the establishment of temporary
magistrates who are musically educated.
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